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Abstract 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and later writings help psychologists to identify 
and work through “pictures” evoked and used in our linguistic practices especially 
when these representations appear to be self-evident and they promote fundamental 
misconceptions. This paper applies Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to theories and 
accounts of combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods in psychology, 
many of which have now been extended to mixtures of qualitative methods with 
contrasting theoretical assumptions. In contrast to pragmatist, realist and social 
constructionist stances, a Wittgensteinian approach examines metatheoretical and 
metamethodological pictures of methodological plurality in a treatment of issues that 
are traditionally explored in terms of epistemological, ontological, interpretative and 
paradigm differences. Arguments that Wittgenstein’s work can strengthen existing 
forms of personal, methodological and deconstructive reflexivity in psychological 
research practices are exemplified with a specific example of combining psychosocial 
and discursive qualitative methods. 
 
Keywords: Wittgenstein, pragmatism, paradigms, realism, methodological plurality, 
mixed-methods
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Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and particularly his later writings have helped 
some psychologists to identify and work through “pictures” evoked and used in our 
linguistic practices. The so-called “private language argument,” for example, is an 
extended conceptual challenge to the notion that psychological first-person words are 
names for private, inner objects such as sensations, feelings and emotions (Harré, 
2006). An analogous image-based and simple representation is evoked by 
Wittgenstein (1953) in highlighting the source of the error: he discusses whether a 
group of people could refer to private or inner feelings in a way that resembles trying 
to describe something called a “beetle” which is in a box that only one person can 
look into. The crucial point is that if the word beetle has a use in the language of these 
people “it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place 
in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be 
empty” (p. 100). Dismantling this simple image-based explanation of how first person 
language functions is important because a host of misleading explanations collapse 
along with it (e.g., saying that I know I am in pain but I can only ever infer pain in 
others).  
Further pictures abound not only in everyday life but also in the specialised 
language games of psychologists talking about their theories and methods. Thoughts 
about communication, for example, often reflect a misleading view that information is 
being transferred from the head of one individual to another (i.e., a “conduit” 
metaphor; Reddy, 1993). Theoretical positions in psychology can similarly evoke or 
be built around a picture in order to communicate a clear understanding of complex 
conceptual relations. For example, talk about reflexivity in psychology, such as the 
inescapably “self-referential quality of theory” (Morawski, 2005, p. 79) when humans 
are the “objects” of study, can lead solutions to be pictured as available at a “second 
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order,” “meta-” or “higher” level in a hierarchy of abstract theorization. An 
alternative, but misleading picture is to consider the type of reflexivity mentioned by 
Morawski to be a pernicious problem with psychology’s very foundations (e.g., 
Flanagan, 1981). Critical examination of issues considered to be central to psychology 
from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s (1953, 1979) later philosophy can use the 
underexamined notion of pictures along with his method and specific writings to 
achieve clarity and overcome the temptation to think a given problem must be seen in 
this way. 
In this paper, I will take the somewhat unusual step of focusing on 
representations of mixed method research or methodological pluralism as the key 
issue in need of clarification. Methodological pluralism, as I shall outline below, is an 
appropriate topic because what psychologists are tempted to say about mixing 
methods incorporates implicit, simple pictures and representations in related 
metatheoretical justifications and metamethodological reflections. I argue that 
engaging with Wittgenstein’s later work from within psychology constitutes a 
potentially useful form of self-critical or reflexive investigation. By reflexive I mean 
any genuinely self-critical attempt by an individual or community of psychologists to 
use the theories, concepts and methods of their own and preferably other disciplines to 
examine relevant concepts and practices in psychology, identify conceptual errors, 
highlight taken-for-granted assumptions, and suggest alternative possibilities for 
psychology in theory and practice. This contrasts with other meanings of reflexivity in 
psychology such as the potential for paradox when a theory (e.g., of creativity) is 
applied to one’s own work and found wanting (i.e., I cannot explain myself). 
Reflexivity as used here also differs from the concept of the active inclusion of 
subjectivity (e.g., of the researcher) in psychological research rather than its reduction 
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or elimination (e.g., as a source of bias that reduces objectivity) as an appropriate 
reflexive scientific attitude (Gough & Madill, 2012). While there is much that is 
valuable in Gough and Madill’s stance, my main aim with regard to reflexivity is to 
show how Wittgenstein’s methods have enduring relevance for a wide range of 
conceptual issues generated in the everyday activities of psychologists. 
The preoccupation with method in psychology as the principle means to 
understand better the nature of psychological objects is an ongoing problem. 
Wittgenstein (1953) famously pointed out that in psychology “the existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
which trouble us, though problem and method pass one another by” (p. 232). 
Accordingly, methodological plurality can only ever be a partial solution to the 
enduring conceptual problems of psychology; especially those caused by 
methodocentrism. Yanchar, Slife and Warne (2008) argue, for instance, that many 
mainstream critical thinking strategies in psychology “combine scientific analytic 
reasoning with other critical thinking approaches, but never depart substantially from 
the overriding disciplinary concern of method-centered scholarship” (p. 266). 
Psychology’s “emphasis on method and method-based reasoning” (p. 266) is 
remarkably persistent because it appears to represent the means by which objective 
descriptions and coherent explanations can be produced. Even when mixed 
quantitative and qualitative approaches are used by an individual or research team, 
there is still the potential for innovations to be considered within a restricted and 
hegemonic conception of critical thinking; that is, a view of critical thinking in which 
theories are examined against a quantitative and experimental evidence base in 
contrast to the broader type of highly conceptual and theoretical critical thinking 
found in theoretical psychology. The ultimate effect may therefore be to include, 
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normalise, and strip qualitative methods of their more critical and theory-driven 
features while simultaneously reducing any role for reflexive theoretical work. For 
this reason it is important to highlight how Wittgenstein’s philosophy has a valuable 
role to play in encouraging critical reflection on the issue of combining methods in 
psychology. 
A further reason for focusing on methodological plurality is that less attention 
is being paid to conceptual and metatheoretical issues as combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods gains widespread acceptance and ideas of mixed methods are now 
being extended to the use of different qualitative methods in research. This latter trend 
is evident also in the emerging use of qualitative meta-analysis or meta-synthesis in 
specific domains of psychological research (e.g., health and psychotherapy research; 
Sandelowski, Barroso & Volis, 2007; Shaw, 2011). In a negative parallel 
development, there is evidence also that even the limited sense of reflexivity in which 
qualitative researchers reflect upon and understand self-involvement in qualitative 
research is not being included and addressed thoroughly in published articles 
(Newton, Rothlingova, Gutteridge, LeMarchand & Raphael, 2012). Thus while 
metatheoretical investigations can appear to invite unresolvable arguments about 
fundamental theoretical commitments, we should not avoid asking difficult theoretical 
and philosophical questions even as the use of new combinations of differing 
psychological methods increases in popularity. 
The argument in this paper proceeds by providing further details in the first 
section about the nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical period. A 
Wittgensteinian approach is outlined so that it is clear how it contrasts with 
pragmatist, realist and social constructionist stances on methodological plurality. 
Further details are provided about how examining pictures―understood in terms of 
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Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and as an underexamined feature of his philosophical 
method―coincides with self-critical work on methodological plurality as it is carried 
out by psychologists. In the second section, the Wittgensteinian identification and 
working through of pictures of methodological plurality focuses initially on 
combinations of quantitative and qualitative approaches promoted as being consistent 
with philosophical pragmatism (Moran, 2007). The third section examines 
combinations of qualitative methods and explores how triangulation practices evoke 
realist pictures of methodological pluralism. Section four examines forms of 
reflexivity mentioned in particular qualitative approaches and their relevance to 
critical examinations of qualitative mixed-method research. In section five, specific 
remarks from Wittgenstein on one of Freud’s psychoanalytic interpretations are 
compared favourably with arguments from Frosh and Emerson (2005) about 
combining discursive and psychosocial interpretations in multi-method qualitative 
research.  
Wittgensteinian philosophy and self-critical work in psychology 
 The central argument outlined here is that Wittgenstein’s (1953, 1979) later 
work, respectively, in the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty provides an 
important means of representing the complex relations between the concepts of 
plurality and reflexivity as they are used in relation to the methods of psychology. 
Although the central differences cannot be addressed in this paper, my critical 
reflexive approach using Wittgenstein’s remarks and method is not the same as 
Ashmore’s (1989) discursive sociology of scientific knowledge, nor does it closely 
follow Bourdieu’s (2004) social capital analysis of science. Nevertheless, it is 
consistent with much of the work that Wittgensteinian philosophers (and 
psychologists who have engaged with his work) have devoted to investigate 
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conceptual features of methodological and empirical issues in psychology (e.g., 
Racine & Müller, 2009). On this view, Wittgenstein’s later philosophical writings are 
potentially useful to any psychologist who wants to make sense of theoretical, 
analytical, subjective and personal doubts about their research (Sullivan, 2002). 
Wittgenstein’s continued relevance to psychology is demonstrated by Harré and 
Tissaw’s (2005) practical guide to Wittgenstein’s work and Bennett and Hacker’s 
(2003) Wittgensteinian account of the philosophical foundations of neuroscience. 
Extension of Wittgenstein’s method to the consideration of contemporary problems in 
psychology shows also that are no reasons, in principle, why the philosophical 
foundations of qualitative psychology and methodological pluralism in psychology 
cannot also be examined in a critical inquiry. Furthermore, they demonstrate that 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods should not be equivocated with discursive 
psychology and social constructionism, despite important connections between 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, discursive psychology (Potter, 2010) and social 
constructionism (Harré, 2004; cf. Hibberd, 2005). 
 But how is it possible for Wittgenstein’s work to help contemporary 
researchers to be self-critical and to achieve clarity on the issue of methodological 
plurality? An extensive exegetical literature in philosophy has emerged to interpret 
and explain the significance of Wittgenstein’s critical remarks on a range of topics in 
psychology (i.e., as it existed in the early to mid-twentieth century). This exegetical 
work counters the misconception that engaging with Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
method from the perspective of psychology means adopting a social constructionist or 
discursive psychology and their respective positions on epistemology, ontology and 
methodology. Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach does not endorse a particular 
philosophical framework such as pragmatism, realism or social constructionism for 
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psychology. Moreover, there are good reasons for thinking that a coherent 
Wittgensteinian reworking of positions on science such as Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm 
account can highlight issues of importance within psychology and its positioning with 
regard to the social and natural sciences (e.g., see Read, 2012).  
 However, philosophers such as Read and some psychologists are highly 
critical of the use of theories in psychology and the social sciences, particularly where 
these create distance between the researcher and their subject matter. Such an anti-
theoretical use of Wittgenstein is employed by Shotter and Katz (1996) in their 
attempts to be reflexive from within a practice. They describe Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy as a method of “social poetics” which can generate additional knowledge 
and insights when used alongside existing practices. Katz and Shotter (1996a, 1996b) 
demonstrated this approach in an experimental mentoring program in a medical 
school, which introduced a new dialogical practice into medical training, and in a 
practice where a “cultural broker” was included in diagnostic interviews so that 
relational and responsive listening could lead doctors to better hear their “patient’s 
voice”. Despite the positive effects of the Wittgenstein-inspired social poetics 
approach in practice, it is still important to recognise that Wittgenstein engaged in a 
different activity to the work of the people and practitioners he commented upon 
(even though he also may have shared similar experiences such as trying to describe 
an emotional experience). It is therefore misleading to present Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical method as something that can be taken from philosophy and inserted 
into the practices of psychology to complement, or worse, compete directly against 
both experimental methods and forms of qualitative inquiry (Sullivan, 2000, 2002).  
Wittgenstein (1953) was very clear when he noted that using philosophical 
methods to examine theoretical and conceptual issues in psychology did not mean that 
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he was doing the work of psychologists (or, for that matter, mathematicians) when he 
examined and compared the concepts used in both practices. Thus, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical methods can be used within psychology and the social sciences to 
achieve clarity—and this might be called doing theoretical or critical psychology—
but this does not mean that Wittgenstein’s methods improve upon or replace those 
used in the practice of interest. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, experimental and 
quantitative methods are not always inherently misguided; rather conceptual errors 
can arise or become consolidated by their inappropriate use in or extension to all 
instances of social and psychological investigation.  
This demarcation and delimitation of philosophy from science might 
ostensibly appear to be consistent with a critical realist perspective in which 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical method has little to contribute to science. Haig (2008), 
for instance, describes conceptual investigations of the type carried out by 
philosophers like Wittgenstein as “a form of ‘grammatical therapy’ carried out on 
theories” (p. 565) and notes that this is “not a distinctive feature of scientific method” 
(p. 565). Instead, he argues that “the most appropriate way to enrich scientific method 
is to better theorize about our existing theories of scientific method and to construct 
new theories of method” (Haig, 2008, p. 565). Engaging with this view is important 
because one of Haig’s further aims is to establish a scientific realist basis upon which 
the qualitative method of grounded theory can have a scientific status that is on par 
with the methods of the natural sciences. This can only happen, according to Haig, if 
psychological researchers accept that they must generate and test abductive theories 
of underlying mechanisms (i.e., inference to the best explanation). 
On Haig’s view, Wittgensteinian philosophical concepts such as language 
games and forms of life could only contribute to psychology if they were developed 
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fully as theories of methods and not certainly not by showing how even theories based 
on abductive methods might create conceptual errors. Shotter and Katz’s anti-
theoretical perspective is somewhat different and appears to complement 
Wittgenstein’s focus on the details of linguistic practices. A central message of 
Shotter and Katz’s (1996) work is to show that new knowledge resources and creative 
discursive practices and can emerge without being solely theoretical: “Wittgenstein 
wants to divert us from describing our particular, practical activities as we think they 
must be (in theory)” (p. 926). However, detailed examples of the language games 
where mundane as well as abstract concepts and particular methods are used can also 
be assembled in order to produce a perspicuous view (or surview) of their use, misuse 
and misrepresentation. Wittgenstein uses the concept of language game to highlight 
mistaken views of how language is actually used and it helps to engage with and work 
through conceptual problems that arise in very particular practical, research and 
theoretical tasks.  
Hutchinson and Read (2008) demonstrate the surview approach by attempting 
a perspicuous presentation of uses of the phrase “perspicuous presentation” and 
related practices of conceptual clarification in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The point is 
not to invite self-referential inconsistency (i.e., reflexive paradox) or to encourage 
general doubt, but rather to show that there are important differences between 
elucidatory (positive) and therapeutic (negative) readings of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical method. An elucidatory stance attempts to create an overview of a 
particular domain of language and practice; such as singular and plural usages of 
psychological concepts in the first-person, second-person and third-person in practical 
contexts (e.g., when alone or with others). The therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy is that his method helps us mostly—as individuals rather than in teams—
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to work through misrepresentations of the use of language that are connected with 
pictures interwoven into our linguistic practices, and which often manifest themselves 
in what we are tempted to say about what we do in practices (i.e., in explanations and 
ultimately empty evocative gestures that Wittgenstein identifies as unhelpful or 
nonsensical). From this view, achieving clarity superficially resembles ridding oneself 
of a psychological problem (e.g., akin to treating obsessive thinking) and appears to 
leave one in a position in which the conceptual problem is successfully treated 
(unless, of course, it returns in a new guise). Wittgenstein realized this in his own case 
by critiquing his earlier pictorial view or theory of language in the “Tractatus Logical-
Philosophicus”; for in that book published in 1922 he stated: “The general form of 
propositions is: This is how things are” (cited in Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 48). 
Commenting on his own work several decades later, he wrote: “A picture held us 
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (p. 48). 
While Wittgenstein undoubtedly examines the use of words in mundane and 
highly abstract contexts, he also noted that words and phrases often evoked pictures 
that seem to underlie and guide correct use. We have already seen how the name-
object picture of language is fundamentally mistaken when incorporated into accounts 
of first-person psychological language (e.g., in attempts to capture what we are doing 
when we describe “inner” experiences of pain, emotions, etc.). When Wittgenstein 
writes about pictures these are, of course, not necessarily private or personal ways of 
seeing the world (i.e., images). The focus is not on instances of pattern creation that 
we cognitively impose upon the world (e.g., that stand out in random ink blots), but 
pictures can occur and be used when talking about particular phenomena. In such 
cases they might have a primarily visual form that could be drawn and explained to 
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others (e.g., as formalized in a diagram) but this should not be taken to mean that they 
are testable representations of the essence of a phenomenon (i.e., that they are only 
useful if they truly correspond with states of affairs in the world). The aim of 
investigating pictures in contemporary psychology, therefore, is not to claim that they 
have precedence over language, but rather to examine how their multiplicity of uses 
are thoroughly intertwined with specific linguistic and rhetorical practices. 
Wittgenstein also analysed pictures embedded in epistemic practices and held 
in place as everyday certainties by their surroundings. For example, he remarked that: 
“The picture of the earth as a ball is a good picture, it proves itself everywhere, it is 
also a simple picture―in short, we work with it without doubting it” (Wittgenstein, 
1979, p. 22). Accordingly, pictures are not inherently good or bad, correct or 
incorrect, but they may be subject to philosophical investigation when they 
misrepresent linguistic practices. They may also be refined according to the needs of 
specific scientific practices. For example, stating that the earth is in fact an oblate 
ellipsoid is important for specific practices such as accurately mapping the globe and 
calculating the area of the earth. Wittgenstein (1979) also acknowledged that what he 
called a “world-picture” might provide the background to practices such as 
Lavoisier’s experiments with substances and description of what takes place during 
burning. In that case, Wittgenstein’s point was that a world picture is learned as a 
child and for this reason “it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as 
such also goes unmentioned” (p. 24e). However, despite the ostensibly similar use of 
“worldview” in Moran’s (2007) overview of paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) approaches to 
mixed methods research in psychology, this concept will not play a major role in the 
Wittgensteinian analysis that follows. 
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It is important that concepts such as Wittgenstein’s (1953) description of a 
simple language game—or even paradigm according to Read’s (2012) 
Wittgensteinian take on Kuhn and science—are used within a practice to highlight 
unexamined features. Moreover, the aim of a Wittgensteinian stance is, as Hutchinson 
and Read (2008) demonstrate with their examination of the concept of “perspicuous 
representation” in Wittgenstein’s writings, to work through and clarify their use. This 
therapeutic approach may—quite wrongly as will be argued below—appear to 
correspond with Haig’s (2005) largely negative account mentioned earlier: 
The clarifications offered are, when read through the hermeneutic of therapy, 
clarifications in the achievement sense. That is to say, they only serve as 
clarifications if our interlocutor recognises them as such, and thus, they lead 
him to see other pictures as equally valid as the one that has hitherto held him 
in thrall and led him to his seemingly insurmountable philosophical problem. 
(Hutchinson & Read, 2008, pp. 156-157). 
After working through a picture (or pictures) internal to a linguistic practice that 
either causes or supports conceptual problems, the result can free a practitioner to 
explore alternative pictures and new approaches. In addition, a resource is created that 
may assist others to find clarity. Debates about realism and constructionism in 
psychology, for example, are an obvious testing ground when the common but 
misleading picture being discussed is how language is or is not isomorphic with “the 
world” (cf. Potter and Hepburn, 2008).  
As the next section will show, Wittgenstein’s philosophical method can help 
to work through pictures in psychology in such activities as using different methods to 
triangulate representations of objective reality. Wittgenstein’s approach is contrasted 
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with uses of Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm account of science to understand different 
theoretical frameworks for mixed methods research in psychology.  
Theoretical frameworks and pictures of mixed quantitative and qualitative 
methods 
Discussion of methodological plurality in psychology generally refers to 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods but is increasingly mentioned with 
regard to the combined use of different qualitative methods. At this point, an extended 
historical reconstruction of the marginalization of qualitative methods and their 
gradual, but arguably still restricted, inclusion in psychology is not required (see 
Madill & Gough (2008) and Walsh-Bowers (2002) for discussion of relevant issues). 
Changed attitudes are evident in descriptions of the use of more sophisticated 
accounts of mixed methodological research (e.g., see Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007) 
which contrast with earlier either-or views of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
For example, in 1998 Tashakkori and Teddlie described an emerging tolerance for 
methodological diversity in the human sciences as signifying the end of the “paradigm 
wars”. They argued that disagreement between adherents of quantitative and 
qualitative methods has reduced as attention has shifted from issues of incompatibility 
and meta-level debate to the development of a pragmatic and strategic stance. 
Furthermore, they highlighted what they felt was a “growing agreement among many 
social and behavioural scientists concerning the basic assumptions that underlie the 
philosophical orientation of pragmatism” (p. 17).  
The potential for qualitative psychologists to become as methodocentric as 
their quantitative colleagues can be challenged by acknowledging Valsiner’s (2000) 
point that numerical representations of social and psychological phenomena are 
generated through qualitative processes. Widespread acceptance that quantitative data 
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are qualitative should foster recognition that, at least within a given mixed-method 
project, “lingering affiliations to either a quantitative or qualitative research approach 
can inhibit the mixed methods researcher’s inclination to combine and make the most 
of the two sets of findings” (Bryman, 2007, p. 13). Acceptance should also challenge 
the manner in which differences between quantitative and qualitative methods are 
maintained in the research process through choices about the timing of each 
component. For example, a sequence of qualitative interviews followed by scale 
construction and quantitative testing can reinforce the view that qualitative methods 
are only useful for exploratory work in relatively new domains of psychological 
research. A further advantage of recognition of the qualitative nature of quantitative 
data collection and analysis would be a greater openness to richer and more realistic 
accounts of the decisions that quantitative researchers make at every step in the 
research process; that is, including narratives which are currently hidden in published 
reconstructions of research according to deeply engrained report-writing conventions. 
 In a bolder stance, Mason (2006) outlines a “qualitatively driven” approach to 
mixing methods although even here there is an attempt to subvert the qualitative-
quantitative divide by emphasising “multi-dimensional research strategies” (p. 10) 
which combine largely macro (quantitative) and micro (qualitative) dimensions 
“governed by the questions that drive the research” (p. 14). This implies a realist 
picture of research as “gold mining” in which quantitative research indiscriminately 
surveys a given territory to reveal promising finds, but only qualitative research 
methods can eventually find valuable “nuggets” of data. Mason also notes that “a 
questioning, reflexive and non-accepting approach to research design and practice” (p. 
21) must be extended “by questioning and being reflexive about the qualitative 
paradigm itself” (p. 21). This continued advocacy of a broad reflexivity as “an 
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important principle for mixed-method working” (p. 21) is very different to Tashakkori 
and Teddlie’s (1998) pragmatist stance which seems to be designed to end further 
critical and potentially divisive reflection and theorizing. Following the stance 
outlined in this paper, reflexivity should extend to highlighting implicit pictures that 
reinforce the appeal and legitimacy of any given combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. 
A similar position is adopted in Madill and Gough (2008) as they use different 
senses of Kuhn’s (1962) concept of paradigm to examine the positioning of 
qualitative methods in psychological science. One of their aims is to show that 
recognition of pluralism in qualitative research maintains “an appropriately complex 
picture of qualitative research in psychology” (p. 255). The resulting table of data 
collection and data analysis methods (which they treat as separately in contrast to the 
combined examination of several traditions of qualitative data collection and analysis 
below), uses Moran’s (2007) paradigm analysis to understand a range of stances that 
address pluralism in the use of qualitative methods as well as in combination with 
quantitative methods. The resulting four paradigms could be used by qualitative 
psychologists to attain some clarity about their stance on methodological pluralism: 
eclecticism, utilitarianism, specialism, fragmentation and pragmatism. The use of 
paradigm is a key means of framing and focusing upon how qualitative and 
quantitative approaches can be combined. Madill and Gough (2008) favour 
pragmatism as an integrative approach showing “promise as a coherent position 
claiming the middle ground between paradigm incommensurability and paradigm 
complementarity” (p. 264). However, they also recognize the enduring appeal of 
realism over pragmatism: “many researchers may want to retain the goal, at least, of 
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obtaining true and accurate, as opposed to (merely) workable, knowledge of the 
world” (p. 264). 
Moran-Ellis et al. (2006) highlight one of the central concerns of pragmatism: 
the use of quantitative and qualitative methods by an individual or team provides 
methodological triangulation. Triangulation, they note, “is an epistemological claim 
concerning what more can be known about a phenomenon when the findings from 
data generated by two or more methods are brought together” (p. 47). Convergent 
findings can be taken to reflect the same dimensions of the phenomenon under 
investigation, while divergence might also reflect the complexity of psychological and 
social phenomena (i.e., it might indicate multifaceted dimensions). Exploring the 
details of triangulation and related pictures that tend to capture its appeal for 
quantitative-qualitative research is an alternative approach to analysing paradigm-
based differences. As the next sections will show, what may be surprising to 
researchers who combine qualitative approaches is that the temptation to implicitly 
accept a realist picture still needs to be challenged. The surprise also for some readers 
will be that Wittgenstein’s engagement with examples of Freudian psychoanalytic 
shows how specific pictures can be identified and challenged even when quite 
different qualitative approaches are combined. 
Pluralistic use of qualitative methods: reflexivity, triangulation and realist 
tendencies 
Different qualitative approaches have contrasting epistemological and 
ontological commitments connected with post-positivism, phenomenalism, feminism, 
hermeneutics, critical theory, post-structuralism, social constructionism or critical 
realism. However, when practitioners of qualitative research are faced with the 
possibilities of combining different approaches the response is often not to attempt a 
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grand philosophical overview (cf. Clarke et al.’s (2014) meta-study approach). Rather, 
choosing which methods and frameworks to combine is both arbitrary and determined 
by the phenomenon, research question, the skills and inclinations of the individual 
researcher and research team. With methodological pluralism also referring now to 
the use of two (or more) qualitative methods in a research programme (cf. Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 1998), it is important to see whether a Wittgensteinian analysis helps to 
understand particular combinations of methods and how practitioners negotiate, 
justify and reflect on them. In general terms, this reflexivity is central to qualitative 
research because the alternative view of an independent world is rejected. While it is 
encumbent on qualitative mixed-method researchers to “explore the ways in which a 
researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs 
such research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p. 228), each approach can have 
different ways of being reflexive and promoting understanding of complementary and 
contrasting issues when working with other qualitative methods. 
 Using a range of qualitative methods—even simply reviewing findings on a 
particular topic that have been created using another qualitative method—can have a 
variety of effects on researchers such as concern about the superficiality of one’s 
work and doubts about compromised standards or methodological fidelity. Barbour 
(1998) concurs with a closely related point about the need to be aware of theoretical 
differences: “Even when we engage in a brief—or indeed prolonged—flirtation with 
other methods, we do not always acknowledge the extent to which they embody both 
different assumptions and different potential” (pp. 355-356). In contemporary 
research practice, it is reasonable to think that a common pattern in qualitative 
psychology is to work successively, rather than simultaneously, on research that uses 
very different methods and frameworks. For example, adopting ideas from 
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interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) in grounded theory (GT) projects can 
be useful in challenging the latter’s model-building and realist features. Articles such 
as Brocki and Wearden’s (2006) critical analysis of IPA in health research also 
provide a valuable resource because they articulate substantive differences between 
IPA and GT methods.  
Frost and colleagues (2010) provide one of the few rigorous examples of 
multiple practitioners using plural qualitative methods to analyse the same text. The 
four qualitative analysis methods employed were GT, IPA, Foucauldian discourse 
analysis (FDA) and narrative analysis (NA). The project was driven by a central 
question of whether “the use of a single qualitative approach to access meaning in 
data raises questions about what the use of another method would have illuminated in 
the data” (p. 2).  Frost et al. also speculated about the possibilities for presenting the 
results of different qualitative methods separately and in combination. On their own, 
the “different interpretations of data can provide views from different dimensions 
from which the one(s) of most relevance to the researcher can be extracted “(p. 3). In 
combination, these different approaches are described as “layers of interpretation” 
that “can provide an array of perspectives of participants’ accounts of their 
experiences” (p. 3). 
 The study highlights sources of interpretative variation as well as the potential 
for greater analytical transparency in qualitative research, although the authors did not 
consider the methodological variation that would be introduced by each research 
assistant (RA) conducting their own interviews (i.e., rather than analysing one text). 
The focus on analysing separate interviews with the RAs (e.g., without the addition of 
a focus group with all the RAs) meant that the authors did not examine similarities 
and differences in the RAs’ interpretations of the interview transcript. While one can 
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imagine practical reasons why the different practitioners of the four main qualitative 
research approaches in psychology did not also conduct their own interviews, 
nevertheless this constraint artificially reduced further sources of difference and 
competence which emerge when researchers collect data and analyse their results 
using different methods and contrasting theoretical frameworks. In addition, the report 
did not indicate whether theoretical advances could be achieved by “comparing 
findings derived from different qualitative methods” or “seeking to compare the 
findings of separate qualitative studies” (Barbour, 1998, p. 359). However, their study 
implies that there need not be one account, reading, interpretation or explanatory 
theory that dominates at the end of a pluralistic investigation. In this respect, their 
work is consistent with other attempts to challenge realist features of the triangulation 
picture. Richardson (2000), for instance, presents an alternative metaphor of 
crystallization which Ellingson (2009) has, in turn, elaborated for qualitative 
practitioners. 
 Triangulation plays a central role in attempts to combine quantitative and 
qualitative research methods that also play down paradigm inconsistencies. However, 
an important question is whether triangulation helps to represent the many and 
complex positions or perspectives generated by mixed qualitative research, as 
indicated by Frost’s (2009) remark: “pluralism of analysis offers a form of within-
method triangulation that encourages the viewing of data from several perspectives” 
(p. 24). In Frost et al.’s (2010) previously mentioned examination of the differences 
generated by independent researchers using different methods (i.e., analytical 
procedures) with the same transcript, the resulting presentation (or picture) of textual 
interpretation invites a realist reading. While the example does not address whether it 
is possible or indeed desirable to make sense of messy differences generated by 
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between-method triangulation, it is clear to many qualitative researchers that 
searching for significant patterns and sources of meaningful agreement and 
disagreement contrasts with the complexity and diversity of personal and social life 
(i.e., even when a very homogeneous group or specific text is investigated).  
 Convergent data, voices, positions, perspectives and interpretations resulting 
from the use of different methods is only one of several features of triangulation. 
Farmer, Robinson, Elliott and Eyles (2006) note that in practice most qualitative 
researchers use an undocumented intuitive approach to triangulation, rather than a 
procedural or intersubjective approach such as team discussion. Thus even with 
explicitly documented and prescriptive triangulation procedures, it cannot be assumed 
that “mixing methods within qualitative research is unproblematic” (Barbour, 1998, p. 
353). It is not clear whether many of the researchers who attempt to combine 
qualitative methods are preoccupied by triangulation procedures, although Denzin 
(2010) suggests there is a consensus that “the use of triangulation should operate 
according to certain ground rules, including, always beginning from the same 
theoretical model, and choosing methods and empirical materials that compliment 
(sic) that perspective” (p. 423). Again there is little discussion of whether the 
metaphor of triangulation—which Bryman (2007) describes as unhelpful for 
integrated reporting mixed quantitative-qualitative research—is transferable to 
qualitative-qualitative research.  
 While realist pictures of convergence upon a common reality are potentially 
misleading when representing mixed methods research, realism nevertheless has an 
allure, or hold, depending on one’s background. With GT conceptualised in realist 
rather than pragmatist terms (Moran, 2007), the scientific integrity of having a means 
of inferring the best explanation is emphasised (Haig, 2005). On this account, theory 
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generation is abductive—rather than deductive or inductive—because identified, 
robust patterns provide the evidential basis for elaborating plausible models of 
phenomena. Theories which identify potential generative mechanisms are then 
evaluated against criteria of explanatory coherence: explanatory breadth, simplicity, 
and analogy (Haig, 2005). Combined with triangulation procedures, this realist 
approach presents a formidable, almost undeniable, means of securing scientific status 
for GT as a specific qualitative research method. But whether it is reasonable to 
position one qualitative method as more scientific than any other, even 
unintentionally, is controversial. Using an additional qualitative method such as DA 
with GT but without endorsing realism and explanatory coherence could easily be 
devalued and the list of methods that could combine with GT might be too restrictive 
for many qualitative researchers. Potential grounds for rejecting or demoting DA in a 
hierarchy of methods that could be used with GT might then include the following: 
DA favours coherence without strong empirical foundations in reality, emphasises 
description over explanation, promotes linguistic fetishism or encourages elaborative 
rather than elucidatory interpretations. 
 However, mixed qualitative method research may, to transfer a phrase from 
the specific rhetorical context of Frost (2009), “resemble triangulation methods in its 
ambition to view data from different perspectives, seeking not to verify meanings but 
to add texture to the interpretation of them” (p. 10). For instance, Morse (2003) 
briefly describes how a grounded theory study could be followed by a 
phenomenological study, with the prescription that “all procedures used in each 
method must adhere to, and be consistent with, the method selected” (p. 201). In 
contrast, Haig (2005) does not discuss the potential value of combining GT with other 
quantitative or qualitative methods. 
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Reflexivity and methodological plurality in combinations of different qualitative 
methods 
 It is important to acknowledge forms of reflexivity that are particular to 
distinct qualitative methods which apply to all research stages. With GT, for example, 
Charmaz (2006) notes that reflexivity is a constant requirement that may result in 
“questioning one’s perspectives and practices” (p. 68). In collecting (and presumably 
analysing) data, Charmaz writes that “researchers need to be constantly reflexive 
about the nature of the questions and whether they work for the specific participants 
and the nascent grounded theory” (p. 32). Others committed to this approach, such as 
Mruck and Mey (2007), offer detailed suggestions about how to do GT reflexively 
without being prescriptive. Plurality is addressed in Charmaz’s (2006) comment that 
“certain research problems indicate using several combined or sequential approaches” 
(p. 15). By implication, methodological plurality is intrinsic to grounded theory: “The 
logic of grounded theory guides your methods of data-gathering as well as of 
theoretical development” (p. 16). However, there appears to be no explicit account of 
how and why grounded theory might be combined with other qualitative methods.  
 IPA qualitative researchers advocate self-reflection and self-critical thinking 
primarily by keeping “a reflexive diary that records details of the nature and origin of 
any emergent interpretations” (Biggerstaff & Thompson, 2008, p. 217). The aim is to 
adopt an approach that “best captures the essence of the person’s thoughts and 
emotions about the experience of the phenomenon being explored” (p. 218) by 
including the experiences of the interviewer and cultivating a “person-professional 
awareness” (p. 221), often in discussion with others. Smith, Flowers and Larkin 
(2009) outline further IPA-related forms of reflexivity in theoretical remarks based on 
Heidegger’s account of forestructures of interpretation. A questioning and abstract 
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interpretative approach is adopted towards the original text and this is documented to 
enable stronger interpretative claims to be checked, while recognizing also that “this 
type of reflexive engagement will vary from analyst to analyst and from project to 
project” (p. 90). Strategies for deconstructing the text are promoted along with general 
recognition that the bracketing of preconceptions means that “a consideration of 
Heidegger’s complex and dynamic notion of fore-understanding helps us to see a 
more enlivened form of bracketing as both a cyclical process and as something which 
can only be partially achieved” (p. 25). 
 With narrative approaches in psychology, research processes and results are 
regarded as constructed narratives, meaning that “writers need to produce an analytic 
discussion of how their own theoretical and biographical perspective might impact on 
their relationships with research subjects, their interpretation of research evidence, 
and the form in which the research is presented” (Elliot, 2005, p. 155). Riessman 
(2008) emphasises similar points and gives the specific recommendation for “students 
to keep a diary, or log, of decisions and inferences made during the course of a 
research project” (p. 191). She argues that this “fosters ongoing reflexivity—critical 
self-awareness about how the research was done and the impact of critical decisions 
along the way” (p. 191). There is no specific treatment of the potential to combine 
narrative methods with other qualitative methods. Nevertheless, much of Riessman’s 
account of narrative methods accords with the broader sense of reflexivity in which 
the relevance and limits of a method and its theory are important considerations.   
 With discourse analysis there is a rich tradition of reflexivity which 
incorporates sociology of scientific knowledge studies that encourage new forms of 
writing and rhetorical and reflexive self-legitimation. However, much of the work 
appears to be reflexive in a clarifying and defensive manner, with self-examination 
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serving to strengthen and refine discourse analysis against competing qualitative 
methods. Nevertheless, Potter and Hepburn (2008) describe discourse analysis as a 
“reflexively mature practice” (p. 277), not only because “any conclusions may apply just 
as much to the researcher’s own discourse as the discourse under study” (p. 276-277) but 
also because there is a genuine attempt “to counter or improve on or reinterpret analyses 
from alternative perspectives that work with assumptions that are realist, positivist, 
symbolic interactionist, social cognitionist or whatever” (p. 277).  This delimitation 
includes critical discourse analysis because the Foucauldian notion of discourse it is based 
on is too broad in its inclusion of language, practices and physical structures (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2008). Critical discourse analysis is therefore regarded as a partially 
overlapping but separate intellectual practice in which reflexivity is construed differently 
as “an awareness of the formative powers that accrue to the historical and disciplinary 
location from which the researcher speaks; formative powers which must be accounted 
for in the analyses such researchers will go on to offer” (Hook, 2005, p. 23). 
 All of these qualitative methods highlight their distinctive features and 
demonstrate an ongoing commitment to refining their methods and analytical 
frameworks. Without exception, however, their accounts of reflexivity do not include 
reflection on potential combinations with other approaches. Similarly, Finlay and 
Gough’s (2003) exploration and illustration of different senses of personal, 
interpersonal and deconstructive reflexivity does not examine substantive conceptual 
connections between reflexivity and plurality. Gough’s (2003) survey and overview 
of different forms of reflexivity is better because it implies that discourse analytic and 
psychoanalytic research methods can be used without contradiction or incoherence. 
However, he does not articulate the grounds for recommending “some balance 
between the extremes of unreflexive, ‘flat’ description, which presents a supposedly 
‘objective’ picture of the phenomenon, and convoluted, meta-reflexivity textual 
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presentations, which move too far away from the phenomenon in question” (p. 32). In 
the approach based on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, a broad reflexivity might be 
achieved by assembling examples of language that appears to be flat, ordinary and 
descriptive as well as metapsychological accounts in order to work through the words 
and pictures that qualitative psychologists invoke to justify their research practices. 
Pictures of methodological pluralism in qualitative psychology: combining 
discursive psychology and psychoanalytic methods 
 Wittgenstein’s philosophical method has argued to play a role in encouraging 
alternative pictures that are “equally valid” (Hutchinson & Read, 2008, p. 157) but 
less likely to generate conceptual problems. In addition, it is also possible to identify 
and challenge pictures that are evoked when discussing issues of reflexivity, 
epistemology and ontology. For example, in relation to discursive psychology, Potter 
(2010) appears to adopt a Wittgensteinian position and method in responding to 
criticism that discursive psychology is not sufficiently reflexive and focuses on 
epistemological rather than ontological concerns. Specifically, in challenging the 
previously mentioned conduit picture of language, Potter emphasises discursive 
psychology’s “reflexive attention to methodological issues, and the close ties it 
weaves between theory, object, and analysis, that lead it to its distinct methodological 
position” (p. 668). 
The focus of discursive psychology on strengthening its distinctive 
methodological position contrasts, however, with the plurality that is increasingly 
evident in psychology. Although discursive psychologists refer to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and their own weave of theory, object and analysis, they appear to be 
disinterested in using the methods of other approaches, such as psychoanalytically-
inspired psychosocial methods. In this last section, Wittgensteinian remarks on 
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psychoanalysis will be used to explore issues that arise when mixed methods research 
includes psychosocial methods. This is possible because Wittgenstein engaged 
positively with Freud’s work and identified only specific conceptual objections. The 
psychosocial trend in qualitative research, exemplified by Frosh and Emerson (2005), 
shows an openness to pluralism in such remarks as: “psychoanalytic concepts add 
meaning to discursive approaches by offering explanations of motivation and 
‘location’ that are not available without such concepts” (p. 311). Frosh and Emerson 
emphasise the importance of a dialogue between discursive and psychoanalytical-
psychosocial theoretical interpretations when interviewers ask about and analyse their 
interviewees’ previously unexamined and deep features of investment, defence and 
the unconscious.  
A vital question, however, is whether the pluralistic inclusion of talk of extra-
discursive or pre-discursive features of psychic life and use of theory-based criteria to 
identify unconscious thoughts and feelings requires tacit acceptance of the requisite 
psychoanalytic ontology. Surely this leads back to a realist picture of mental life or, at 
the very least, constitutes an instance of methodological pluralism that is inconsistent 
with a Wittgensteinian approach? Confirming his critical stance towards Freudian 
psychoanalysis, Wittgenstein remarked: “New regions of the soul have not been 
discovered, as his writings suggest” (as cited in Gunnarsson, 2005). Although 
Wittgenstein might appear to dismiss psychoanalysis with the remark that a 
subconscious realm is “just a mode of representation”, nevertheless he “did not want 
to cast doubt upon the talk of unconscious thoughts, but upon a picture of such 
thoughts that holds us captive” (Gunnarsson 2005, p. 274). Wittgenstein’s remarks do 
not imply an in principle rejection of combining psychoanalytic methods and an 
analysis of language as long as any picture of the unconscious has been worked 
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through. Reflecting present concerns, it is plausible that psychoanalytic interpretations 
could be used in the practices of psychosocial research to overcome a kind of 
superficiality or, at the very least, collusion in avoidance and repression (Billig, 1999) 
that can occur between interviewer and interviewee. Moreover, talking with others 
about what is unspeakable or unsayable as part of a research investigation need not be 
engaged in primarily to establish the objectivity, truth or reality of unconscious 
conflicts.  
But what grounds are there for thinking that Wittgenstein would allow the type 
of psychosocial and discourse analytic combination mentioned by Frosh and 
Emerson? Wittgenstein’s remarks on Freud’s interpretations from published case 
study material show how conceptual analysis can be used to critically assess 
explanations that purport to reveal the hidden reality of a psychological phenomenon. 
In a situation analogous to a reader who questions the interpretation of an exemplar in 
a qualitative report, Wittgenstein challenged Freud’s interpretation of the real 
meaning of a flowering branch in a female patient’s dream resided in its unconscious 
phallic associations (Cioffi, 2007, p. 181). What Wittgenstein objected to was 
“Freud’s assumption that the correctness of his interpretation impugned her own view 
that the dream was ‘beautiful’” (p. 183). In this case, Freud’s patient subsequently 
“ceased to take pleasure in her dream as a result of his having persuaded her that there 
was a causal relationship between her shameful sexual desires and her sense of 
exaltation at the beauty of her dream” (p. 183). The lesson of great importance to 
novel mixed-method qualitative research is that clarity is needed about when it is 
better to seek a further description of an experience from a participant, rather than 
provide an explanation which purports to reveal the reality of that experience. 
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 The example fits with Frosh and Emerson’s (2005) view of psychological 
explanations in a critical social psychology in which “psychoanalytic interpretive 
strategies” are used and “may (or perhaps must) involve introducing a reflexive 
process in which interpretations might be tested within the text itself, treating them as 
discursive constructions the effects of which can be examined and discussed” (p. 
322). The contribution of a Wittgensteinian challenge to the picture of unconscious 
conflicts is the suggestion that any deeper theoretical interpretation must be explored 
with the person. This is not a denial that there is something real and important that 
emerges from the complex interaction between an interviewer and interviewee that 
can be enhanced by new concepts and theories. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that 
it is crucial to engage with the details and messiness that emerges when different 
methods are combined, without being preoccupied by pictures internal to the language 
of those methods, their containing or guiding theories and accounts of how coherence 
might be better achieved. Hopefully qualitative psychologists with an interest in 
combining their work with other approaches can benefit from this analysis and seek to 
work through their reflexively generated concerns using relevant features of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical method and writings as a resource.   
Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to use Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and use an 
underexamined feature of his work—the role of pictures in linguistic practices—to 
encourage reflexivity within psychology about potentially misleading ways of 
representing the plural use of methods in psychology by individuals or research 
teams. Mixing methods in psychological research has been conceived as an 
integrative stance in which quantitative and qualitative methods are mixed within a 
pragmatist framework. In contrast, eclectic combinations of methods might have some 
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pragmatic benefits but also lead to considerable theoretical contradictions. Valsiner’s 
position on quantitative approaches as the outcome of qualitative processes was 
presented as part of a more complex rapproachment within psychology. Breaking 
down rigid distinctions between quantitative and qualitative methods does not, 
however, guarantee that the results from mixed method research will be coherent. For 
that reason, a broad reflexivity was advocated for quantitative-qualitative research 
that contrasts with the pragmatist stance towards methodological plurality. 
 In a further contrast with pragmatism, it was claimed that the pictures internal 
to accounts of quantitative-qualitative and now in qualitative-qualitative research—
such as those connected with triangulation—often evoke or invoke a realist 
philosophical framework. Examples of a several sequential and simultaneous 
qualitative methodological combinations were then explored to demonstrate how 
combined approaches reveal competing, complementary, overlapping or fragmented 
layers, levels, perspectives or aspects of social psychological phenomena. Versions of 
reflexive work and reflexivity from prominent (i.e., distinct) qualitative methods were 
examined. Few proponents of particular methods articulated explicit connections 
between reflexivity and plurality. The main exception (and example of within-method 
triangulation) was argued to be Frost et al.’s (2010) study of plural use of qualitative 
methods. However, this study was argued to artificially limit sources of between-
method messiness and inadvertently evoke realism. In contrast, an explicitly realist 
form of GT was discussed in which the generation of abductive explanations is central 
while the value of combinations with other “less scientific” qualitative methods 
appears to be limited. Despite the scientific status such a realist framework bestows 
upon some forms of qualitative research, it also appears to undermine the potential 
contribution of conceptual analyses of methods (i.e., the application of any form of 
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grammatical elucidatory or therapeutic philosophical approach to conceptual 
problems that arise when using multiple methods in psychology and when talking 
about and picturing how combinations of methods can be used in psychology and 
related disciplines).  
 Pictures internal to multi-method triangulation were then examined and 
alternatives such as crystallization were acknowledged as alternative ways of making 
sense of the complexity and messiness generated by combining qualitative 
approaches. In contrast to the allure (or hold) of realist ontology and the view that all 
pictures are equally valid, the analysis focused on the use of interpretations of 
unconscious conflicts grounded in discursive data in psychosocial research. Frosh and 
Emerson’s challenge to discursive psychology to include psychoanalytic interpretive 
strategies was found―perhaps surprisingly to some readers―to be compatible with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical working through of a misleading picture of the 
unconscious as a kind of inner “region” in a specific criticism of a Freudian 
interpretation. Wittgenstein’s objection to Freud’s interpretation of the real meaning 
of a dream opened up the same possibility discussed by Frosh and Emerson; namely, 
that the theory and method of psychoanalysis can generate new layers and depths of 
interpretation in combination with other methods when conducting predominantly 
qualitative and discursive research in psychology. This rapprochement can be 
achieved not by offering a theoretical explanation of the real meaning of the 
participant’s remarks, but rather through identifying misleading pictures and by 
seeking further descriptions in conversation with a participant.  
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